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Banking worldwide is a high profile industry and plays an imp?rtant role 
not only in a country's economy but the world's as well. Operatt~ns of. the 
world's largest banks span many countri~s a~d play ~ key role ~~ ~ocrety. 
The banking industry has a special function m ensurmg the stab,thty and 
integrity of the worldwide financial system. If. one of the world s largest 
banks were to fail the fear of the consequences ts of great_concern to bank 
fegulators and governments worldwide. Banks are dtffer~~t to non-
financial corporations due to their public purpose and the posttton of trust 
that they hold in the community. . 
Corporate governance and the role of the directors in banking has never 
been more important, not only has there been a large number of changes 
to co orate governance regulations but bank management has to address 
the is~es in the implementation of the Bank for International Settlements 
(BIS) Basel II capital adequacy accord. This survey of the wodd's top 100 
banks is to determine if there are similarities or dtfferences rn thet~ cor-
orate governance characteristics as measured by performance and ~tsk. 
p In 2002 the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) came into force as a reaction to 
th hi h profile corporate failures of Enron, WorldCom, Parmalat and t~ g These failures also highlighted executive compensation arran~e­~e~~: that many investors questioned as being excessive. Variou~ co~ntnes 
d the world introduced similar corporate governance legtslatlon to 
~~~nand stock exchanges tightened their listing ~les in terms ~f corpor~te 
governance. The changes ~re.having ~far-reaching effect even m countnes 
that have not introduced stmtlar reqmrements. . 
Today, banks are large complex organizations with_ opera~10ns not 
only across countries but are offering a number of financtal servt~s other 
than just commercial banking, Citibank is a good example With oper-
ations in stock braking, insurance, funds management, to name a fe":'. The 
board of directors of these banks require people who are well eqmpped 
184 
A survey of corporate governance in banking 185 
to understand the complex nature of the organization, the countries they 
operate in and be able to provide the independent oversight required as 
directors. 
PERSPECTIVES AND RECENT RESEARCH 
Recent research shows that good firm performance is linked to good cor-
porate governance. However LeBlanc and Gillies (2003) suggest the evidence 
is not as strong as many report, this is also supported by Chidambaran et al. 
(2006) who find no significant performance differences between firms with 
good or bad governance changes. Gompers eta/. (2003) developed a govern-
ance index based on 24 firm specific characteristics around shareholder 
rights and found that high governance index firms had higher firm value and 
profits. Brown and Caylor (2004) develop a governance index based on 51 
governance factors. They also find higher governance scores drive return on 
equity and profit margins whilst Core eta/. (2006) contend that weak govern-
ance did not cause problems with stock returns. 
FTSE Research and Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS) produced a 
joint research report in 2005 about their Corporate Governance Index 
(CGI) where they rated 2200 companies from 24 countries. In their report 
they identify five governance areas: ownership, compensation, audit, board 
and equity structure, on which they based their index calculations. In study-
ing the board structure they were most interested in the composition and 
processes of the board as well as the structure and independence of key 
standing committees. In the audit area they focused on the processes and 
composition of the committees. 
CGI rankings are rated from five (highest) to one (lowest). The top three 
countries in the CGI rankings were the United Kingdom (4.75), Canada 
(4.71) and Ireland (4.25). The Scandinavian countries had the lowest index 
values at slightly above one. In the report they ranked 18 industries and the 
banking industry ranked fifth last with an index value of 2.65. The report 
highlights that there is a large variation of corporate governance factors 
across countries and industries. 
Grunert et al. (2005) found that credit rating agencies take into account 
governance issues. This is forcing firms in countries that have not intro-
duced similar legislation to SOX to adopt improved governance measures 
if they want to borrow in international markets. Roberts (2004) agrees 
saying firms are being forced to conform to international governance 
requirements to avoid bad ratings. This market pressure has resulted in 
banks in Southeast Asia and Japan adopting worldwide governa'fe stan-
dards. Shinsei Bank in Japan is a good example of the changes these banks 
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are undertaking. Shinsei has changed its board from 5 to 17 members with 
a range of backgrounds and countries. 
Questions have been raised on the effectiveness of .the new c~rporate 
governance measures. Leblanc and Gillies (2003) question the notion that 
an independent director is a better director contending that re~lators 
have lost sight of the role of the board which is 'indepe~dent o~ersight.of 
management and corporate stewardship' (p. 3). T~ey_b~heve t~e tdea of Ill· 
dependent oversight is driving regulators who are ms1sting ~n mdependent 
directors as in Australia, Canada, the US and the Umted Kingdom. 
Westphal (2002) contends that past research has found little evidence to 
suggest that independence leads to a better run company. Lawler and 
Finegold (2006) on the other hand suggest that external directors bring 
diversity and experience and are a benefit for the governance of a firm. 
There have been a number of studies on specific governance attributes. 
Anderson eta/. (2004) found that board independence, size and a fully in~ 
dependent audit committee had positive benefits when it came to creditors 
and loans. Bebchuk eta/. (2005) examine the way directors are elected and 
this has an influence on firm value, staggering the election of directors 
reduced value. Brown and Caylor (2004) ascertain it is the characteristics 
surrounding board committees and their independence that had an import-
ant bearing on performance and Dahya and McConnell (2005) looked at 
boards with more independent directors and established they made better 
decisions as reflected in share price changes. Mak and Kusnadi (2002) dis-
covered smaller boards have a positive relationship with firm value. 
Studies prior to SOX by Jensen (1993), Mehran (1995), Yermack (1996), 
Klien (1998), and Vafeas (1999) on board characteristics, found com-
position, number of board meetings, committees, structure/slZe of the 
board number of outside directors, plus the compensation of the external 
direct~rs important. In our study many of the above variables are now 
required under SOX or equivalent legislation and therefore these factors 
are no longer able to differentiate performance as before. It should be noted 
Leblanc and Gillies (2003) suggest there has been little learned about what 
is effective corporate governance. They believe it is board process ~n t~e 
decision making that is important and little research has been done m th1s 
area. 
METHODOLOGY 
In this study we examine the corporate governance characteristics of the 
world's top 100 banks. The term bank in this stu~y is use_d generi~ally t_o 
refer to the entire operations of the reporting entity as disclosed m theu 
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consolidated annual report, not just their banking operations. The ranking 
of the top 100 banks was obtained from Forbes.com 2005 listing of the 
world's top 2000 companies. Appendix A contains a list of the banks, 
country of origin and the value of total assets. Reviewing the Federal 
Reserve's December 2005 report of foreign banks operating in the United 
States, 62 percent of non-US banks in the survey have operations in the 
United States at a branch or subsidiary level and this requires a number of 
the non-US banks to comply with the Sarbanes-Oxley Act as well as their 
own home country regulations. The requirement for foreign companies to 
comply with SOX came into force for :financial year statements filed after 
15 April 2005. This helps to explain why a large number of the non-US 
banks included sections in their annual report on how they were moving to 
be compliant with SOX although there is little evidence that what they are 
doing is anything more than the minimum possible. 
The information used here on corporate governance and financial figures 
was extracted from each bank's annual report and proxy statement for 2004 
obtained from the bank's web-site. In compiling the data it was found that 
the information reported by banks in their annual reports differed leading 
to some problems in obtaining information. For example the disclosure of 
external director compensation, number of board meetings, or years of 
service for each director was sometimes not reported. 
The information obtained on the governance characteristics of the board 
of directors consisted of: the number of board members, the number of 
internal directors, independence of the chairperson, the number of board 
meetings per year, the average number of years a director served on the 
board and the compensation paid to external directors. For the activities of 
the board, information gathered included existence of an audit committee, 
compensation committee, risk committee, and the independence of the 
audit and compensation committee. The annual report was reviewed to see 
if there were sections detailing the board's view on corporate governance 
and risk setting for the bank. 
In the second part of the study the governance characteristics are con-
verted into an index where regression tests are carried out to establish if 
there is significance in the differences in performance, risk measures and 
governance characteristics. Table 9.1 sets out the governance characteris-
tics and the index score allocated to each variable. A value of one indicates 
that the bank complied with the requirement and zero that they did not. 
For example the governance characteristic that the board has an audit com-
mittee was given an index value of one. If the bank did not have an audit 
committee or information was not provided the index value is zero. As a 
result of reporting differences between countries it was difficult~ obtain 
the number of board meetings per year, compensation of external board 
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Table 9.1 Board Characteristics- allocation of governance index values 
Actual values 
Number of directors 
Number of internal directors 
Index numbers only 
Chairman of the board 
Number of board meetings 
Average years on the board 
Compensation external directors 
Corporate governance statement 
Risk statement 
Board audit committee 
Audit committee composition 
Board compensation committee 
Board compensation committee 
Board risk committee 
Regression values 
Number of directors from annual report 
Percentage of internal directors to all 
directors from annual report 




















Not all independent 
No committee 
Not all independent 
No committee 
members and number of years of board service. Therefore in the first 
regression test these variables have an index value of one if this informa-
tion was provided or zero if not. 
Consolidated balance sheet information gathered was aimed at deter-
mining the level of loans to assets and basic risk. Information included 
total assets, loans and advances to customers, shareholders' funds, profit 
for the year and as a measure of risk; BIS capital percentage, equity to 
assets (equity capital ratio) and provision for loan losses to loans. The per-
formance measures used in the analysis was return on assets and return on 
equity. 
Analysis of the data was conducted in two parts. The first part was to 
establish an average for all of the 100 banks in the survey. This was to enable 
comparison analysis between banks, countries and regions. The second 
part of the study was directed towards a series of regression tests to evalu-
ate if there were significant relationships between the governance variables 
to performance and risk. Before performing the regression analysis a study 
of correlations between the corporate governance variables was carried 
out. Appendix B sets out all the governance variables and the initial corre-
lation matrix. 
Appendix B shows a high degree of correlation between some of the 
governance variables, for example, board risk statement and the existence 
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of a board risk committee. The evaluation of the correlations was system-
atically run through several stages to evaluate each high correlation to 
establish which variable should be removed for the regression tests. Once a 
variable was removed the process was repeated to logically remove highly 
correlated variables. In the first review there was a high correlation with the 
average years a director had served on the board, the number of board 
meetings plus the compensation of external directors. The removal of the 
two variables average years on the board and number of board meetings 
was made on the basis that banks that reported these items usually reported 
all three. As each variable was assigned a value of one or zero and the 
majority of banks had all three theire was high correlation amongst the 
variables. 
The second review revealed a high correlation between the audit com-
mittee and the compensation committee. Ninety-three percent of banks 
reported they had an audit committee and 89 percent had a compensation 
committee. With almost all banks having an audit committee it was 
believed that this characteristic did not contribute to the analysis and thus 
the audit committee was deleted. The third review of correlations showed 
high correlation between all external directors on both the audit commit-
tee and compensation committee. Most banks that reported these commit-
tees tended to comply with the SOX requirement for the audit committee 
but not always for the compensation committee. The removal of the audit 
committee comprised of all internal members was considered less likely to 
influence the regression tests. 
The fourth review showed a high correlation with compensation of ex-
ternal directors and the compensation committee consisting of all external 
directors. The data on director compensation was poor and an index 
number was assigned for this variable with one for providing the infor-
mation and zero if they did not. The majority of banks that reported the 
compensation of external directors also had external members on their 
compensation committee and the compensation of directors was seen as 
not adding to the analysis and therefore deleted. 
The final review revealed a high correlation with the compensation 
committee consisting of all external members and the board risk com-
mittee. It was more unlikely that a bank had a compensation committee 
with all outside directors rather than a risk committee. When this 
variable was retained and the risk committee removed there was still a 
high level of correlation in the variables. Therefore the variable compen-
sation committee consisting of all external members was removed and 
the risk committee retained. This resulted in six governance variables 
listed in Table 9.2 with their coefficients for the regression an.flysis in 
part two. 
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Table 9.2 Final correlations of governance variables 
Number Percentage Independent Compensation Governance Risk 
of of internal chairman committee all statement statement 








chairman 0.1315 -0.2357 
Risk commit. -0.0749 0.0071 -0.0737 
Corporate 
governance 
statement 0.1980 -0.0326 -0.1275 0.1887 I 
Risk stat. 0.0833 0.1234 0.0513 0.2860 0.1689 
RESULTS OF THE STUDY- COMPARISON TO THE 
AVERAGE BANK 
This section reports the overall summary results of the survey. The world's 
top 100 banks come from 28 countries. Refer to Appendix A for the list of 
banks. The US dominates with 26 banks and the next largest countries are 
Japan and the United Kingdom with eight each. Twelve countries had just 
one bank, Appendix C contains a list of the countries represented in the 
survey and the number of banks. In compiling the data from the banks' 
annual reports it was observed that there are a number of differences in 
how the top banks are governed from director numbers, committee struc-
tures, number of internal directors and independence of the chairperson. 
Table 9 .3, Panel A provides a summary of the average bank plus maximum 
and minimum values for each item across the sample. Table 9.3, Panel B 
shows percentage compliance with board governance characteristics. The 
average bank in the survey will have 14 directors and 25 percent will be 
internal. Banks on average hold ten board meetings a year and the direc-
tors have served almost eight years on the board. The average bank will 
have a board statement on corporate governance, an audit, compensation, 
and risk committees. 
Ninety-nine percent of the banks reported a positive return on assets, the 
average return on assets is 0.96 percent and return on shareholder funds is 
14.68 percent. The external directors' remuneration was not reported by 
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Table 9.3 The 'average' bank 
Panel A: Figures for the average bank plus maximum and minimum values 






Number of directors 14.6 
Number of internal directors 3. 7 
Number of board meetings I 0.2 
Average years on the board 7. 7 
Balance sheet statistics 
Return on assets(%) 
Return on equity(%) 
Bank total assets US billion 
Percentage loans to assets 
Percentage provisions for 
loan losses to loans 
Percentage equity to assets 
Percentage BIS risk capital 








Panel B: Percentage of banks complying with 
Governance characteristics 
Independent chairman of the board 
Board statement on corporate governance 
Board statement on risk direction for bank 
Board audit committee 
Audit committee all independent directors 
Board compensation committee 
Compensation committee all independent directors 


































33 percent of the banks. In relation to US banks the calculation of external 
director remuneration was an estimate based on their proxy statements and 
the previous years' board and committee activities. 
The definition of the banking industry is broad and the 'banks' in the 
study are large complex financial organizations (LCFO) with the reporting 
entity involved in many different financial aCtivities. An interesting statistic 
from the information is the traditional role of banking 'loans and advances 
to customers' have reduced in significance of balance sheet prop~rtions. 
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The average value of loans and advances to customers is 56 percent of total 
assets. The reason for this lower figure could be due to mergers and acqui-
sitions over recent years where commercial banks have merged to become 
financial service firms. 
All the organizations in the survey have been identified as being in the 
banking industry by Forbes. However some banks are really financial 
service firms. For example State Street of the US has only 5 percent of 
assets as loans. Other banks with very small percentage of loans to assets 
are Mellon Financial 18 percent, Natexis Banques Populaire and BNP 
Paribus with 29 percent each. In contrast Washington Mutual of the US 
made specific mention that it did not consider itself a bank but rather a 
holding company that owned a bank. Interestingly Washington's percent~ 
age of loans to assets at 67 percent is higher than the survey average of 56 
percent. 
In compiling the data from the annual reports the majority of the 
World's top 100 banks are LCFOs with operations spanning several coun-
tries and they offer a broad range of financial services. For these banks to 
be successful and be in this listing it is reasonable to assume that they must 
have good corporate governance procedures. 
The review of countries and the regions of Europe and Southeast 
Asia to the average bank revealed some variation in board composition 
and committee structure. Nonetheless their overall performance and 
balance sheet composition was not significantly different from the 
average bank. Overall Australian, Canadian and Southeast Asian banks 
are very similar. The Japanese and French banks have some of the most 
notable differences. Table 9 .41ists the summary for countries where there 
were five or more banks and the regions of Europe and Southeast Asia. 
Each of the major differences in governance characteristics are discussed 
below. 
Board of Directors 
Many studies have indicated that board size is seen as being important in 
good corporate governance. The average bank board has 14.6 directors 
with 3.7 (25 percent) being internal members. Not all banks reported 
remuneration for their non-executive directors therefore there was no 
meaningful data to analyse. The governance code in the United Kingdom 
suggests independent directors should not serve for more than ten years 
and the chairperson of the board should be external. This study revealed 
the average number of years' service that directors have served on a bank 
board is approximately seven and half. The US banks typically had the 
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data it was observed the longest-serving external board member had been 
on one bank's board for 47 years. Only 38 percent of the banks have an 
independent chairperson and it was noted that none of the US or Japanese 
banks had this characteristic. 
The Japanese banks were clearly different in their board structure. The 
Japanese bank board was small with an average of nine directors and 
the majority internal. They did not provide detailed information on 
board committees and membership. The smallest board was found in 
Japan with five directors and they are all internal. Citibank, the world's 
largest bank in 2005, had 20 directors, with five internal including the 
chairperson. 
The Italian banks had the highest number of board members averaging 
19.6 and the French had 50 percent internal directors the second highest in 
the study. In the case of the French banks many of the internal directors 
are staff elected representatives. 
The US banks had the lowest number of board meetings per year at 8. 7 
compared to the average of 10.2. The Italian banks had almost one-and-a-
half times more board meetings than all other banks at 16.2 meetings in 
the year. Monte Dei Paschi bank of Italy had 33 meetings in the year, the 
most of any bank. Several banks reported only four board meetings in the 
year but this did not seem to cause significant deviation from the average 
bank performance. 
Board Committee Structures 
All banks reported on their corporate governance practices however only 
72 percent reported a board policy on risk setting and 77 percent of banks 
have a risk committee. In an industry where risk management is very impor-
tant and forms part of the new Basel II capital adequacy requirements this 
seems a low compliance rate. Eighty-nine percent of banks had a compen-
sation committee and the composition of this committee varied with 56 
percent having all external directors. All banks other than the Japanese 
banks had an audit committee but only 67 percent of the banks had all 
independent members. The Japanese banks have an audit board instead of 
an audit committee, 
The French banks had the lowest compliance with audit and compensa-
tion committees having all external board members. One possible explana-
tion for this is that the French banks have a large number of elected staff 
representatives on their boards and these elected staff members are treated 
as being equivalent to external directors. Italian banks and the banks in 
Southeast Asia had low compliance with board risk committees, '(lnly 30 
percent having a risk committee. 
;.j' 
I :j. 
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Equity to Assets and Capital Adequacy 
All banks reported healthy Bank for International Settlements capital ad-
equacy ratios to risk assets, the average for the 100 banks is 12.58 percent 
compared to a minimum requirement of eight. In contrast the average per-
centage of equity to assets was merely 6.6 percent almost half the BIS 
figure. It should be noted that the BIS ratio compares risk assets taking into 
account the counterparty's credit risk and many banks have substantial 
non-bank lending activities including insurance and in some G I 0 countries 
insurance assets do not count in the calculation. In addition non-equity 
items can be included in the capital component in calculating the ratio such 
as long term subordinated debt. 
The 'banks' in this study are large complex financial organizations and 
the calculation of the balance sheet equity to total asset ratio for some 
banks appears low. In reviewing the banks' equity to assets levels it poses a 
question regarding how banks with low levels of equity will adjust to the 
new capital adequacy rules required under Basel II. The BIS consultative 
document Overview of the new Basel Accord, released in January 2001 
indicated that the new accord would apply not just to the banking group. 
They said the new accord would apply on a 'consolidated basis only at the 
highest level' (p. 11). Many of the banks indicated in their annual report 
that they were moving to adopt the new Basel II capital risk framework. 
Some examples of banks that have low equity to assets levels are 
Commerzbank of Germany with 2 percent equity to assets and a BIS 
capital ratio of 12.6 percent. Their loans to assets figure is 32 percent. 
Commerzbank reported risk assets of $189.4 billion compared to total 
assets of $575.9 billion (32.9 percent risk assets to actual assets). Erste 
Bank of Austria has 2.4 percent equity to assets, a BIS ratio of 10.2 percent 
plus loans to assets of 52 percent. Erste bank's risk assets to total assets 
ratio is 46.8 percent. Credit Agricole of France has equity to assets of 3.1 
percent and a BIS ratio of 11.7 percent. Credit Agricole's loans to assets are 
62.4 percent and the percentage of risk assets to total assets are 52.5 
percent. The above banks are just three of the 22 in the study with equity 
to assets levels below 4 percent. Current BIS capital rules require banks to 
have a minimum of 4 percent Tier 1 capital, however this 4 percent is cal-
culated on risk assets not total assets and some G 10 countries have an 
exemption for insurance activities. 
The French banking industry has the lowest level of equity to assets with 
an average of 3.2 percent compared to the average. bank's level of 6.6 
percent. The French banks did report a healthy 11.2 percent BIS capital. 
French banks have relatively lower levels of loans to assets and hence lower 
risk assets plus larger insurance operations which could account for the 
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difference. The banks in the US had the highest equity to assets level at 9.2 
percent and an average 12.4 percent BIS capital. 
Loans to Assets and Provision for Loan Losses 
The average bank's loan to assets is 56.7 percent and the provision for loan 
losses to loans is 1.97 percent. The French banks have very low loans to 
assets of 38.6 percent, however they have a higher provision for loan losses 
to loans of 2.8 percent. The French banks were the second largest group of 
banks in terms of total assets. The French banks have average assets of 
$US652.1 billion. The top seven US banks are the biggest banks with an 
average of $725 billion. Australian banks had the highest loans to assets 
percentage at 74.3 but the lowest provision for loan losses at 1 percent. 
Return on Assets and Equity 
The average banks return on assets is 0.96 percent and return on equity 14.7 
percent. The Japanese and French banks had the lowest return on assets at 
0.3 percent and 0.4 percent respectively. The French banks have lower levels 
of equity than the other banks and a larger reliance on debt therefore 
higher leverage. The Japanese banks are improving their performance after 
the well publicized problems of past loan losses. The return on equity was 
also low for the Japanese banks at 8.3 percent. 
The French banks have a low return on equity of 11.3 percent compared 
to the average of 14.7 percent despite their higher gearing levels. The 
average return on equity for all European banks was high at 21 percent. The 
top bank in terms of return on equity is OTP Bank of Hungary at 32 
percent. Akbank of Turkey had a return on assets of 2.9 percent, however 
their return on equity was close to average at 16 percent. The Standard 
Bank Group of South Africa earned 26 percent on equity and was the 
second highest to OTP with a healthy return on assets of 2.6 percent. 
In looking at the board structure of OTP Bank it has a small board of 
six directors with 33 percent being internal and they did not report how 
many meetings they have a year. Also OTP bank did not report on board 
committees, corporate governance or risk statements. Akbank has a small 
board with nine directors and 55 percent are internal. Akbank did have 
statements on risk and corporate governance and a board committee for 
risk but not an audit or compensation committee and the board met 12 
times a year. Standard Bank on the other hand has 19 directors with 19 
percent internal. Standard Bank's directors had been on the board for an 
average of 7 years and they meet six times a year. These diffel"e,lces in 
governance characteristics have not impacted on their performance. 
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RESULTS OF THE REGRESSION ANALYSIS 
As described in the methodology section the key governance variables for 
the regression analysis are based around the characteristics of the board 
of directors namely, number of directors, percentage of inside directors, 
independent chairperson, and statements from the board on corporate 
governance, risk, and the existence of a risk committee. These were used to 
evaluate return on assets, return on equity, BIS capital adequacy, equity to 
assets, and provision for loan losses to loans. Table 9.5 provides the results 
of the regression analysis for each of the governance variables and per-
formance characteristics for the 98 banks that provided information on the 
number of board members and identified who were internal. 
Table 9. 5 Regression results for six governance variables and 98 
observations 
Regression results of governance variables to bank performance and risk 
measures. 
Return Return BIS Equity Provision 
on on capital to for loan 
assets equity ratio assets losses 
Number of -0.0003 -0.0020 -0.1495 -0.0005 0.0417 
directors (0.02522)' (0.15776) (0.08502) (0.43466) (0.22411) 
Percentage -0.0001 -0.0005 -0.0094 -0.0007 0.0117 
of internal (0.00001)" (0.12225) (0.61071) (0.000005)" (0.10893) 
directors 
Independent -0.0035 0.0033 -0.5799 -0.0260 0.2993 
chairman (0.00075)" (0.78940) (0.44882) (0.00001)" (0.92306) 
Risk -0.0001 0.0091 -0.8661 -0.0062 -1.0506 
committee (0.91424) (0.53858) (0.34065) (0.35916) (0.00433)" 
Board -0.0211 -0.1750 3.1973 -0.0327 -0.7755 
governance (0.00004)" (0.00483)" (0.39325) (0.23903) (0.60168) 
statement 
Board risk -0.0002 0.0085 -0.1719 -0.0085 0.0922 
statement (0.82863) (0.54568) (0.84201) (0.18663) (0.78778) 
Regression R2 0.3637 0.1379 0.0521 0.3308 0.1365 
Significance 0.0000001 ** 0.0321 * 0.5477 0.000001** 0.03387' 
of F Statistic 
Notes: The figures in parentheses are the P-values from the regression test and the figures 
above the bracketed figure is the coefficient. 
** Indicates significance at the I percent confidence level 
Indicates significance at the 5 percent confidence level 
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The multiple regression analysis for return on assets and equity to assets 
had the most significant results at the I percent level. In both cases the 
significant governance characteristics at the l percent level was percentage 
of internal directo'rs to directors and independent chairperson both with 
negative coefficients. Indicating that a smaller number of internal directors 
are favorable and an internal chairperson would improve bank perform-
ance and increase equity to asset levels. However the conclusion could be 
slightly biased in that all US banks have internal chairpersons and the 
highest levels of equity to assets. This results in a higher return on assets 
than other banks that have higher leverage. In interpreting the result of 
more external directors are important, it is argued that external directors 
bring a new perspective to the organization that improves performance. 
The evaluation of the BIS capital adequacy was not statistically sig-
nificant. The return on equity and provision for loan losses were only 
significant at the 5 percent confidence level. In the analysis of the return on 
equity the significant governance variable was a board statement on cor-
porate governance which does not seem to be logical given that 99 percent 
of the banks had this statement. This could indicate that there is another 
variable that has not been identified in the study or from prior research that 
is important. 
The significant governance variable in determining the provision for loan 
losses to loans was the existence of a risk committee which had a negative 
coefficient. This would seem to be at odds with the notion of loan loss pro-
visioning. The interpretation could be that with a risk committee more 
detailed analysis is put into reviewing the loss provisions or the bank has 
better credit modeling ability and it could be possible that the provision for 
losses is a more accurate reflection of the potential losses compared to 
banks without such committees. 
A second regression analysis was performed that included the numbers 
reported for board meetings in a year and the average years of service on the 
board rather than in the first regression analysis which included simply the 
index value of one or zero for these items. Changing these variables reduced 
the number of banks in the analysis to 68 and removed all the Brazilian, 
German and Italian banks from the analysis as well as reducing the numbers 
of Japanese and French banks. The inclusion of the variables as numbers 
increased the number of governance variables without correlation problems. 
Table 9.6 shows the results of this analysis. At the 1 percent significance level 
the performance measure return on assets was highly significant and meas-
ures of BIS capital adequacy, equity to assets, and provision for loan losses 
were all significant at the 1 percent level. Return on equity was significant at 
the 5 percent confidence level. The overall results of the regression imaroved 
with higher R2 values and improved significance levels. 
200 Corporate governance in banking 
Table 9.6 Regression results eight governance variables 68 observations 
Regression results for reported numbers of direct~rs, percentage of intern.al 
directors to directors, average years of board servtce and number of meetmgs, 
compensation committee, compensation committee all independent boa_rd 
members, board statement on risk regressed to bank performa~ce and nsk 
measures. 
Return Return BIS Equity Provision 
on on capital to for loan 
assets equity ratio assets losses 
Number of -0.0085 -0.0821 0.0096 0.0005 0.0511 
directors (0.50645) (0.60928) (0.88788) (0.50213) (0.22286) 
Percentage of -0.0104 0.0436 -0.0144 -0.0008 -0.0151 
internal (0.00657)" (0.34933) (0.46721) (0.00016)*' (0.21343) 
directors 
Independent -0.3418 1.8710 -0.9540 -0.0285 -0.0851 
chairman (0.00101)" (0.13658) (0.07613) (0.0000)" (0.79251) 
Average years -0.0098 -0.2745 0.0698 0.0005 O.o!05 
on the board (0.55763) (0.19249) (0.43487) (0.59441) (0.84702) 
Number of -0.0164 -0.1461 -0.0162 0.0002 0.0451 
board (0.21159) (0.37457) (0.81666) (0.80057) (0.29167) 
meetings 
per year 
-20.6174 -0.1177 -3.6195 
-2.0393 -2.7705 Compensation 
committee (0.00000)** (0.43199) (0.00000)" (0.00000)" (0.00019)" 
Compensation 0.3367 5.1252 -0.5342 0.0028 -0.6315 
committee all (0.00706)" (0.00126)" (0.41085) (0.66819) (0.11367) 
independent 
directors 
-0.0862 Board risk 0.0381 1.0675 0.2140 -0.0103 
statement (0.71097) (0.40888) (0.69709) (0.07151) (0.79689) 
Regression R2 0.5942 0.2053 0.8055 0.7023 0.3378 
Significance 0.000000** 0.02981* 0.00000** 0.00000** 0.0013** 
ofF Statistic 
Notes: The figures in parentheses are the P-value from the regression test and the figures 
above the bracketed figure is the coefficient. 
** Indicates significance at the 1 percent confidence level 
Indicates significance at the 5 percent confidence level 
Changing the governance characteristics of average years of board 
service and number of board meetings per year from index values to 
actual values did not prove to be significant factors in their own right for 
the second regression analysis. The governance variable compensation 
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committee was significant at the 1 percent level for all measures except 
return on equity. Interestingly the coefficient is negative for all re-
gressions. In analyzing the result for return on assets does this mean that 
banks with compensation committees pay higher rewards to their senior 
executives? 
To answer this question a review of the banks' annual reports in relation 
to the operation of the compensation committee was conducted and it 
was noted that these committees select a peer or aspirant group to 
compare their executives' salaries to. A large number of bank compensa-
tion committees stated that they wanted their executives to be remuner-
ated at or near the top of the peer group. If each bank takes this approach 
it seems that salaries will always be increasing as the peer group remuner-
ation levels are always increasing. Another factor is most banks list some 
of the world's top 20 banks in their peer group. The compensation com-
mittee reported that the setting of executive salaries had a flow on effect 
for the rest of the bank staff. Given the significance of this characteristic 
it would seem that compensation committees are increasing wage costs 
and reducing profits. Banks without such committees are possibly not 
taking as active a role in comparing remuneration arrangements for 
senior staff. 
Gordon (2006) agrees with this finding. He reports: 
in setting executive pay, compensation committees typically relied on the com-
pensation consultant that also provided firm-wide compensation and human 
resources guidance. This consultant is hired by management and earns the 
largest part of its fee from the firm-wide assignment. Such a conflicted con-
sultant is unlikely to make recommendations or offer viewpoints that senior 
management would find distressing. (p. 28) 
The other governance variable that is significant at the I percent level is 
the percentage of internal directors with a negative coefficient. This vari-
able was also significant in the first regression test and indicates lower levels 
of internal directors are important and seems logical as the independent 
board members bring an external perspective to the bank. 
A third regression analysis was run on the number of board members 
only and this did not prove to be significant at the 1 percent level. It was 
noted that the sign for the coefficient was negative for all performance and 
risk measures indicating that small boards are better as found in past 
research. Brown and Caylor (2004) have suggested the optimal board size 
is between six and 15, however in this study we have not tried to evaluate 
the optimal size of the board. 
Several other regression tests were evaluated including one on th!l total 
governance index value but this failed to produce a meaningful result. A 
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Table 9. 7 Regression results for eight governance variables and 
68 observations 
Regression results for reported numbers of directors. pe~ntage of 
internal directors to directors., average years of board servtce and number 




















































(0.03346)' (0.20929) (0.00008)'* (0.47548) 
-0.!034 -0.0201 -0.0002 -0.0247 
(0.63031) (0.91022) (0.89275) (0.68141) 
-0.1507 0.2666 0.0016 0.0991 







Regression results of number of directors to performance 




















Notes: The figures in parentheses are the P-value from the regression test and the figures 
above the bracketed figure is the coefficient. 
** indicates significance at the I percent confidence level 
indicates significance at the 5 percent confidence level 
regression test using the numbers for board of. directors, perce~tage of 
internal directors, number of years on the board, rndependent chairperson 
and number of board meetings per year failed to change the results of the 
first regressions tests and are shown in Table 9. 7. 
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CONCLUSIONS 
There have been a number of studies into corporate governance character-
istics and firm performance. It has been observed that there is variation 
between researchers as to what variables are important. This study of the 
world's top 100 banks demonstrates that there are differences in corporate 
governance. However, it does not seem to make a significant difference in 
performance as measured by return on assets. 
The comparison study of the various countries showed that the Japanese 
banks tend to have a small number of directors, which according to some 
researchers is a positive attribute but our study failed to find this charac-
teristic significant. However the Japanese banks had the lowest return on 
assets and equity. In our tests it was found that the percentage of internal 
directors was significant at the 1 percent confidence level. The lower the per-
centage of internal directors the better the return on assets and this is one 
of the major differences of the Japanese banks compared to the average 
bank as they have approximately 40 percent internal directors. This also 
explained the differences in the French and Italian banks' low return on 
assets. 
The large percentage of internal directors assisted in the explanation of 
low equity to asset levels for the Japanese, French and banks in the United 
Kingdom. There was no governance variable that satisfactorily explained 
the return on equity and BIS capital. 
Overall the effect of the new governance legislation seems to be that 
banks have added a number of committees to meet the requirements of 
legislation such as SOX but all this has done is remove these variables as 
predictors of performance that previous researchers had found important. 
This study examined 13 governance characteristics and found the in-
dependence of the board may become the most important characteristic 
in determining bank performance. The results of the study did not suggest 
that the chairperson of the board has to be independent as some legisla-
tion calls for. 
In summary the key findings are that banks that have fewer internal 
directors may perform better than banks that have higher percentage of 
internal directors. The move by boards to establish audit and compensation 
committees are no longer a differentiator in performance. 
This study highlighted some areas for further investigation, for example, 
large banks with low equity to total asset levels. The new Basel II capital 
adequacy rules may cause some banks to review their operations as 'banks' 
and split their Operation into commercial banks and financial service firms 
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APPENDIX 9A: TOP 100 BANKS 
Rank Bank Country Assets Rank Bank Country Assets 
Citigroup United States 1484.10 51 Bank of Ireland Ireland 130.91 
2 Bank of America United States lll0.46 52 Standard Bank Group South Africa 80.73 
3 HSBCGroup United Kingdom 1031.29 53 CICGroup France 195.75 
4 Royal Bank of Scotland United Kingdom lll9.90 54 DnBNOR Norway 105.46 
5 JPMorgan Chase United States 1138.47 55 PNC Financial Services United States 77.3 
6 BNP Paribas France 1228.03 56 Golden West Financial United States 106.89 
7 Bare lays United Kingdom 1002.09 57 State Street United States 94.04 
8 Wells Fargo United States 427.85 58 Banco Popular Espafiol Spain 84.83 
9 HBOS United Kingdom 729.31 59 KeyCorp United States 90.74 
"' 
10 Wacha via United States 411.14 60 Monte Dei Paschi Italy 153.71 
~ 11 Mizuho Financial Japan 1306.60 61 Erste Bank Austria 161.27 
12 Societe Generale Group France 678.36 62 Firstrand South Africa 68.87 
13 Banco Santander Spain 435.75 63 DBS Group Singapore 107.51 
14 Lloyds TSB Group United Kingdom 450.02 64 BCP-Bco Com Portugujs Portugal 97.26 
15 Mitsubishi Tokyo Fin! Japan 1014.56 65 Sumitomo Trust & Banking Japan 145.82 
16 ABN-Amro Holding Netherlands 825.81 66 Regions Financial United States 84.08 
17 Sumitomo Mitsui Financial Japan 962.87 67 Mellon Financial United States 37.12 
18 BBVA-Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Spain 422.08 68 Sberbank of Russia Russia 50.53 
19 Credit Agricole France 987.79 69 BOC Hong Kong Hong Kong/China 98.22 
20 Royal Bank of Canada Canada 351.74 70 Natexis Banques Populaire France 170.95 
21 Natl Australia Bank Australia 298.36 71 Tiirkiye Is Bankasi Turkey 30.76 
22 UniCredito Italiano Italy 299.22 73 Northern Rock United Kingdom 82.13 
23 US Bancorp United States 195.10 74 Alliance & Leicester United Kingdom 86.47 
24 Washington Mutual United States 307.92 75 United Overseas Bank Singapore 82.65 
25 Dexia Belgium 439.58 76 National Bank of Greece Greece 67.56 26 Nordea Bank Sweden 330.03 77 M&TBank United States 52.94 27 Banca Intesa Italy 324.11 78 Shinhan Financial South Korea 116.73 
28 Bank of Nova Scotia Canada 228.37 79 Mitsui Trust Japan 119.49 29 Commonwealth Bank Group Australia 213.59 80 St George Bank Australia 50.85 30 ANZBanking Australia 187.69 81 Akbank Turkey 20.76 31 Toronto-Dominion Bank Canada 255.15 82 Come rica United States 51.77 32 Danske Bank Group Denmark 340.Q7 83 Resona Holdings Japan 381.18 
33 Sanpaolo IMI Italy 252.79 84 National Bank of Canada Canada 72.65 34 Westpac Banking Group Australia 177.76 85 Kookmin Bank South Korea 156.23 
35 Canadian Imperial Bank Canada 227.85 86 OTPBank Hungary 23.04 36 National City United States 139.28 87 AmSouth Bancorp United States 49.69 37 Bank of Montreal Canada 217.73 88 Eurohypo Germany 283.65 
"' 
38 Banco Bradesco Group Brazil 69.63 89 Unibanco Group Brazil 29.88 c 39 Standard Chartered Group United Kingdom 141.69 90 Malayan Banking Malaysia 46.92 
" 40 Sun Trust Banks United States 127.79 91 BPVNGroup Italy 60.9 41 Bank of New York United States 94.53 92 Marshall & Ilsley United States 38.98 42 Fifth Third Bancorp United States 98.29 93 Northern Trust United States 45.28 
43 Svenska Handelsbanken Sweden 203.02 94 North Fork Bancorp United States 60.67 44 Allied Irish Banks Ireland 138.46 95 Capitalia Italy 159.55 45 Commerzbank Germany 575.94 96 Banche Popolari Unite Italy 78.92 46 BB&T United States 100.51 97 Banco de Sabadell Spain 57.39 47 Banco do Brasil Brazil 89.99 98 Oversea-Chinese Banking Singapore 49.73 
48 SEB-Skand Enskilda Bank Sweden 239.48 99 Sovereign Bancorp United States 54.47 49 FOreningsSparbanken Sweden 153.57 100 Popular United States 44.4 
50 State Bank of India Group India 127 102 Bank of Yokohama Japan 101.42 
.. 
APPENDIX 9B: CORRELATIONS OF GOVERNANCE VARIABLES 
Number Pen:entage Independent Average Number Audit Audit Risk Corporate Board Compensation 
of of internal Chairman Yom of Committee 
'" 
Committee Governance Risk committee 
Directors Directors on Board external Statement Statement 







Directors -0.2557 1.0000 
Independent 
Chairman 0.1315 -0.2358 1.0000 
Years on 
" 
Board -0.0371 -0.3225 -0.!384 1.0000 
5: Compensation 
external 
directors 0.0415 -0.3530 -0.0127 0.6133 1.0000 
Number of 
Board 
Meetings 0.2212 -0.1638 -0.1010 0.0707 0.1127 1.0000 
Audit 
Committee 0.2235 -0.6492 0.1811 0.3864 0.3633 0.3409 1.0000 
Audit all 
external -0.0749 0.0071 -0.0738 0.2860 0.1523 0.3!98 0.1599 1.0000 
Compensation 
Committee 0.1980 -0.0327 -0.1276 -0.0610 0.2005 0.4379 0.1493 0.1887 1.0000 
Compensation 
all external 0.0833 0.1235 0.0513 -0.0470 0.0971 0.1758 -0.0609 0.2860 0.1690 1.0000 
Risk 
Committee 0.2147 -0.2193 -0.0777 0.3319 0.1639 0.6878 0.2781 0.3842 0.3012 0.2556 1.0000 
Governance 
Statement 0.1904 -0.5717 0.1070 0.4415 0.3522 0.2792 0.6405 0.1005 0.1223 -0.0288 0.4059 1.0000 
Risk Statement 0.0415 -0.3530 -0.0127 0.6133 1.0000 0.1127 0.3633 0.1523 0.2005 0.0971 0.1639 0.3522 
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